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ABORTION LAW-Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago
Board of Health, Invalidating City Health Regulations
Applicable to First Trimester Abortion Procedures
In no other procedure, including the removal of a mole in a hos-
pital, is a local board of health barred from making rules for pro-
per health care.1
In the wake of Roe v. Wade,2 there have been numerous problems
regarding permissible state regulation of abortion.3  One of these
problems encountered by state and local health officials has been the
establishment of standards for medical facilities performing abor-
tions. This article examines the complexities and the difficulties in-
volved in any effort to regulate what remains a very controversial as-
pect of the law.
FRIENDSHIP MEDICAL CENTER, LTD. V.
CHICAGO BOARD OF HEALTH4
After the United State Supreme Court's abortion decisions5 the
Chicago Board of Health promulgated certain health regulations gov-
erning abortion clinics. Several months later the Friendship Medical
Center, Ltd. and its owner, Dr. T. R. M. Howard, brought suit to en-
join the Board from enforcing the regulations6 and to obtain a decla-
ration that these rules were unconstitutional.
1. Quote from Dr. Eric Oldberg, President, Chicago Board of Health, appearing
in Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. For a comprehensive discussion of recent abortion-related problems see Note,
Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and Legislation,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (1974).
4. 505 F.2d 1141 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Mar. 25,
1975).
5. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), was a companion case to Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Chicago Board of Health Abortion Service Regulations are reprinted in an ap-
pendix to the lower court's decision. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board
of Health, 367 F. Supp. 594, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
The regulations at issue were extensive and detailed. They required that each abor-
tion service keep records of medical histories, test and examination results, social serv-
ice records, and admission and discharge notes (§ IV(a)). The Board of Health re-
quired the clinics to submit monthly status reports. These included the number of pa-
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In the district court the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the abor-
tion regulations restricted their patients' rights to privacy. Judge Aus-
tin held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to assert violations of
their patients' privacy rights since the patients were capable of seeking
relief on their own behalf. 7 Consequently, the fundamental right to
privacy was not at issue in the case. As a result, the principles of Roe
and Doe which require a compelling state interest to justify restric-
tions on abortion were inapposite to the question of whether the abor-
tion regulations were constitutional.8 Instead, Judge Austin employed
the traditional test of whether a city has properly exercized its police
power in the health area, and he found that the regulations did not
violate the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and due process. The
court reached this conclusion by finding a rational relationship be-
tween the regulations and the city's interest in "preserving the health
of all abortion patients regardless of the duration of their pregnan-
cy."gig
Standing
Since the Roe and Doe decisions, the courts have uniformly recog-
nized the standing of physicians to challenge the validity of govern-
mental regulations of abortions. 10 Indeed, the issue has not even been
tients requesting and receiving abortions, the age of each patient, and the name and ad-
dress of any patients who developed complications (§ IV(b)). Each abortion facility
was required to have a knee or foot controlled sink adjacent to rooms where abortions
were performed (§ VI). In addition, suitable waiting, dressing, and post-operative re-
covery rooms were necessary (§§ IX, XII). The regulations required an elevator large
enough to accommodate a standard stretcher whenever an abortion service was located
in a building of more than one story (§ VIII).
Additionally, each non-hospital abortion service was required to have a written affilia-
tion agreement with a hospital providing for emergency treatment for its patients (§
1(d)). Furthermore, the rules required that this agreement provide for the clinic's use
of the hospital's laboratory facilities and of its blood bank (§ X(b)). Each abortion
service was also required to have organized transportation facilities capable of transport-
ing emergency patients to the affiliated hospital within fifteen minutes (§§ I(d), VII).
The abortion regulations required that clinics be supervised by a "board certified" ob-
stetrician or surgeon (§§ XIII(b), I (f-g)), and that a registered professional nurse with
post-graduate experience in obstetric or gynecological nursing be on duty at all times
that the facility was in use (§ XIV(a)).
The regulations also required that a complete medical history be taken from each pa-
tient and that certain laboratory tests be performed (§ XVI(c)). The most contro-
versial regulation required a 24-hour waiting period between initial examination and ter-
mination of pregnancy to allow time for review of all laboratory tests and "to permit
and encourage thorough consideration and a firm decision by the patient regarding ter-
mination of pregnancy" (§ XVI(e)).
Finally, the regulations provided the Board of Health with authority to close any abor-
tion clinic which was in violation of any of the standards set forth (§ XIX).
7. 367 F. Supp. at 599.
8. Id. at 601.
9. Id. at 603.
10. See, e.g., Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974).
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
raised in some cases challenging statutory abortion standards." How-
ever, in light of Judge Austin's decision, the plaintiffs were compelled
to argue the standing issue on appeal. The Board of Health agreed
with Judge Austin that plaintiffs did not have standing and could not
assert their patients' rights. Since Friendship Clinic was in compliance
with the regulations, the Board asserted that plaintiffs did not face a
sufficient threat of prosecution. 2
In contrast to the district court's determination, the Seventh Circuit
found that the plaintiffs had standing to assert their patients' privacy
rights. In so holding, the court found it noteworthy that the Board of
Health could deny registration to, or could close any abortion facility
which was not in compliance with its regulations. 13 Also considered
significant was the fact that the Municipal Code of Chicago' 4 gave
certain Board officials the power to arrest anyone in violation of
health regulations.' Thus, both an abortion clinic and its physicians
could be subject to municipal sanctions. Judge Sprecher, writing for
the majority, stated that the "continuing restrictive effect" of the reg-
ulations was a sufficient deterrent to warrant the plaintiffs' standing. t6
The court further noted that Doe v. Bolton1 held that physicians fac-
ing possible prosecution for performing illegal abortions have stand-
ing to assert the invalidity of a state criminal abortion statute.'
Therefore, actual prosecution was not a prerequisite for seeking relief
in the courts.' 9
The plaintiffs' standing was further justified by the existence of the
physician-patient relationship. The court noted that a physician is "in-
11. See, e.g., Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hallmark Clinic v.
North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. N.C. 1974).
12. Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v. Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141,
1146 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1975).
13. Id. at 1145-46. Although there was a concurring opinion filed in the case, all
three judges agreed that plaintiffs had standing.
14. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 9, § 9-5 (1973).
15. 505 F.2d at 1146.
16. Id.
17. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
18. 505 F.2d at 1146. In Doe v. Bolton the plaintiff physicians were threatened
with prosecution for violation of a criminal statute. In contrast, a violation of the abor-
tion regulations at issue in the Friendship case would only have meant action by the
Board of Health to ensure compliance. The court of appeals found that such possible
action was a sufficient threat to the plaintiffs to justify standing. 505 F.2d at 1147.
In fact, on several occasions the Board did close abortion clinics which were not in
compliance with its regulations. For example, one clinic was closed for 12 days for
failing to perform pre-operative physical examinations, for keeping improper records,
and for having inadequate surgery and recovery areas. Chicago Tribune, Aug. 28. 1974,
§ 1, at 2, col. 3. Another clinic was closed for refusing to permit inspection of its prem-
ises, and for telling some women that they were pregnant when they were not. Chicago
Tribune, Feb. 8, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
19. 505 F.2d at 1146-47.
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tegrally involved" in the making of the abortion decision.2" Since this
close relationship was present in the Friendship case, the court found
that plaintiffs were not seeking to assert rights of third parties with
whom they were only "marginally involved."'" Rather, the physician-
patient relationship ensured that plaintiffs were proper parties to raise
their patients' rights.
Board of Health Regulations
Finding that the plaintiffs had standing to assert their patients' pri-
vacy rights, it was then appropriate for the court to test the abortion
regulations by the principles set forth in Roe and Doe. Those cases
provided the primary basis for the court's decision in Friendship that
the Board of Health regulations unconstitutionally infringed a wom-
an's right to privacy by regulating abortion in the first trimester.
In Roe v. Wade,22 the Supreme Court held that the fundamental
right of privacy is broad enough to include a woman's decision to ob-
tain an abortion. 3 Since the right to an abortion is a fundamental
right, any regulations restricting that right must be justified by a gov-
ernmental interest which is "compelling." 2 4  The Court recognized
that there are two state interests which become compelling during
pregnancy. First, the state's interest in the health of the abortion pa-
tient becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester.2 5 Second,
the state's interest in protecting "potential life" becomes compelling
with the fetus' viability,2 6 which the Court recognized to be near the
end of the second trimester.27 The Court held that since the state had
no compelling interest during the first trimester, it followed that dur-
ing that period:
20. Id. at 1147.
21. Id. An argument can be made that the situation involved in Friendship is dis-
tinguishable from that involved in Roe v. Wade. The emphasis in Roe was on a
woman's right to make the abortion decision in consultation with her attending physi-
cian. 410 U.S. 113, 163. This implies a close relationship, as suggested in Friendship.
But the establishment of clinics for "lunch hour abortions" presents a slightly different
situation than existed before Roe. Now, the decision to have an abortion is often made
before a woman goes to a clinic. See Buying Protection at the Abortion Mill, CHI.CAO,
Jan. 1975, at 14 (comments of plaintiff Dr. Howard). Such a situation lacks the pres-
ence of a real physician-patient relationship, and the involvement of the physician may
well be only marginal.
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Id. at 153.
24. Id. at 155.
25. Id. at 1631. This conclusion was based on the finding that mortality rates for
women undergoing first trimester abortions were as low or lower than the mortality rates
for natural childbirth. Id. at 149. But see notes 57 through 65 infra and accompany-
ing text.
26. 410 U.S. at 163.
27. Id. at 160.
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the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical
judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abor-
tion free of interference by the State.28
In Friendship, the Board of Health contended that the abortion
regulations were valid since they were rationally related to a legitimate
state interest in the health of the abortion patient. The court of ap-
peals, however, noted that in light of the fundamental right involved,
the applicable test was not whether there was a rational relationship,
but whether a compelling state interest existed which would justify the
implementation of the regulations.29 The court concluded that the
above quoted language from Roe made it "abundantly clear" that reg-
ulations reasonably related to the health and safety of the woman
could only be justified after the end of the first trimester when the
state has a compelling interest in the health of the abortion patient."0
The Board of Health conceded that the right to privacy protects the
abortion decision. In attempting to justify its regulations, however,
the Board argued that the abortion decision itself is distinguishable
from its implementation. It contended that the regulations did not re-
strict the decision but merely affected the medical facility in which it
is performed. It relied on the above-quoted language from Roe as
supporting this position. The Board further argued that the right to
privacy did not include the right to be free of all health regulation, but
only those which restrict the abortion decision. Thus the defendants
submitted that the crucial test should be whether the regulations inter-
fered with the effectuation of the abortion decision."a
This argument might have influenced the court had not some of the
regulations been so obviously contrary to the Supreme Court deci-
sions. 2 But the court rejected the Board's arguments and stated that
the "regulations by their very nature restrict the abortion decision and
affect whether and in what manner an abortion will take place." 3
28. Id. at 163.
29. 505 F.2d at 1150. The court noted that the regulations might meet the tradi-
tional rationality test, but found that there was no basis in the record for making such
a determination. Id.
30. Id.
31. Brief for Appellees at 8.
32. One abortion regulation (§ XVI(e)) required a 24-hour waiting period between
initial examination and termination of pregnancy "to permit and encourage thorough
consideration and a firm decision by the patient regarding termination of pregnancy."
367 F. Supp. at 614.
33. 505 F.2d at 1151.
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The Friendship court held that there was an additional reason for
invalidating the regulations. Once again following the rationale of
Roe, the court observed that the Board of Health regulated abortions
in a more stringent manner than it regulated medical procedures of
approximately the same risk to a patient's health. When a fundamen-
tal right is involved, such a difference in regulation can only be justi-
fied by a compelling state interest. Since there can be no such interest
in the first trimester of pregnancy, the regulations were in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.34
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court found that an abortion per-
formed in the first trimester of pregnancy is a relatively safe proce-
dure. The Court based this finding on evidence showing that mortali-
ty rates for legal abortions performed early in pregnancy are "as low
or lower than the rates for normal childbirth. '35 From this finding the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that there was no sufficient justification "for
more extensive governmental regulations, purportedly based on
health considerations, for one procedure than the other." However,
the court rejected the next logical step which would have been to com-
pare the regulations on abortion to regulations on hospital childbirth
procedures. The Friendship court held that comparison to the regula-
tions on hospitals would be inappropriate because the Supreme Court
had determined that hospitalization could not be required for first
trimester abortions.17 The court instead compared the abortion regu-
lations to the local regulations concerning dispensaries."' It observed
that the latter are not as extensive as the regulations on abortion, and
that matters included in the abortion regulations are left to the judg-
ment of the physician by the dispensary ordinance.3 9
But the dispensary regulations are a weak basis for comparison.
They were not intended to regulate facilities in which surgical pro-
cedures are performed, 0 and they are inadequate for that purpose.
In addition, it is surprising that the Friendship court determined that
abortion clinics were clearly covered by the ordinance.41 It is true that
34. Id. at 1152-53.
35. 410 U.S. at 149. But see notes 57 through 65 infra and accompanying text.
36. 505 F.2d at 1152.
37. Id. at 1152 n.16.
38. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN CPAL CODE Ch. 118 (1973).
39. 505 F.2d at 1152-53.
40. Interview with Dr. Robert E. Lane, Asst. Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecol-
ogy, McGaw Medical Center, Northwestern University, and Medical Consultant, Chi-
cago Board of Health, in Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 6, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Lane
interview].
41. 505 F.2d at 1152 n.16.
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the ordinance's definition of a dispensary seems to cover abortion
clinics. 2 However, a look at the exemptions from coverage43 suggests
that an abortion clinic, such as the Friendship Medical Center, may
be exempted from the ordinance completely.44 Thus, the basis of the
court's conclusion is unpersuasive since the dispensary standards do
not purport to be comprehensive health and safety regulations of pro-
cedures comparable to abortions.
However, other courts faced with the question of the validity of
governmental regulation of abortion in the first trimester have
reached the same result as that reached in Friendship.4" For example,
in Word v. Poelker,"6 relied on in Friendship, the Eighth Circuit in-
validated a St. Louis ordinance which imposed some restrictions sim-
ilar to the Chicago Board of Health regulations.47 The ordinance was
found invalid for failing to exclude the first trimester from its cover-
age and also for singling out abortion for regulation different from
comparable medical procedures.48 The Word court stated that the de-
fendant had failed to point out any "other single surgical procedure
where doctors [were] required to 'prove up' their overall fitness" as
the St. Louis ordinance forced them to do.
Similarly, the court in Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dept. of
Human Resources,5" held that Roe and Doe exempted abortion clinics
42. CICAGO, ILL., MuNIcIPAL CODE ch. 118, § 1.1 (1973). Section 1.1 reads in per-
tinent part:
"Dispensary"-As used in this chapter, "dispensary" means any place . . .
which operates . . . under the name or title of clinic, dispensary, [or] health
center . . . for the purposes of furnishing at the place . . . advice, diagnosis,
drugs, remedies, or treatment, to any person . . . not residing or confined in
the place ...
43. Id. § 1.2. This section reads in pertinent part:
This Chapter does not apply to, and no license provided in this Chapter is
required by:
1. A place or establishment wholly owned or operated by one or more licensed
physicians and surgeons . . . and used as the office for the practice of
medicine and surgery. . . of such owners, regardless of the name used pub-
licly to identify such place ...
44. In fact, of the twelve abortion clinics registered with the Board of Health only
four including Friendship Medical Center, were licensed as dispensaries. Interview with
Jeanette Paulsen, Acting Director, Bureau of Institutional Care, Chicago Board of
Health, in Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 3, 1975.
45. There are also cases invalidating regulations imposed by public hospitals forbid-
ding elective abortions in the first trimester. See, eg., Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495
F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974); Doe v. Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
46. 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974).
47. The ordinance required, inter alia, that a physician applying for a permit must
document his training and experience. 495 F.2d at 1353. It also required that a clinic
submit a copy of a transfer agreement with a hospital that is located within 15 minutes
travel time of the abortion facility. Id. at 1353-54.
48. Id. at 1352.
49. Id.
50. 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
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from any licensing requirements not applicable to medical facilities in
general. On the issue of regulations imposed on early abortions, the
court stated:
Under Roe and Doe, if North Carolina may regulate the perform-
ance of first-trimester abortions at all, it may do so only to -the ex-
tent that it Tegulates tonsillectomies and other relatively minor
operations. 51
Approaches to Abortion Regulations
Generally, governmental regulations concerning abortion proce-
dures can be divided into two types. First are regulations which are
directed specifically and solely at abortions. This type of regulation
was invalidated in the Friendship and Word cases. Second are health
regulations which cover a range of medical procedures including
abortions. Although this type of regulation was not before the Friend-
ship court, the majority stated that in its view, because of the funda-
mental right to an abortion in the first trimester, such regulations
must meet the compelling interest test to be valid.5 2 The application
of this standard meant that:
in all probability nothing broader than general requirements as to
the maintaining of sanitary facilities and general requirements as
to meeting minimal building code standards would be permissible. 5s
This conclusion stems from an overly strict interpretation of the
first trimester rule enunciated in Roe. However, it is questionable
whether Roe requires such a result. In his concurring opinion in
Friendship, Judge Fairchild, relying on the following language from
Roe, expressed the position that the Supreme Court recognized that
the state had an interest sufficient to support general health regula-
tions applicable to first trimester abortions:54
51. Id. at 1157. In addition, in Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn.
1974), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903
(1975), the Minnesota Department of Health regulations on abortion were invalidated,
along with several statutory provisions, since they failed to distinguish between the
first and second trimesters.
52. 505 F.2d at 1153-54.
53. Id. at 1154. The court left open the possibility that a narrowly drawn regulation
covering a specific problem unique to abortion could be compelling. In such a situation
the Board of Health would have to prove that there is a medical problem unique to abor-
tion which is beyond the scope of a physician's medical judgment. Id.
But it seems that a showing of a problem which makes certain abortions in the first
trimester more dangerous than others should be sufficient to justify this type of narrow
regulation. Moreover, complications arising in second trimester abortions cannot be said
to be outside the scope of a physician's medical judgment, yet that trimester is subject
to state regulation.
54. 505 F.2d at 1154-55 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
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Of course, important state interests in the area of health and medi-
cal standards do remain. The State has a legitimate interest in
seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the
patient. This interest obviously extends at least to the performing
physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the availability
of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or
emergency that might arise. The prevalence of high mortality
rates at illegal 'abortion mills' strengthens, rather than weakens,
the State's interest in regulating the conditions under which abor-
tions are performed. 5
Judge Fairchild further contended that regulations applicable to a
broad class of similar medical procedures would be a "valid exercise
of the State's interest in protecting health and need only satisfy the
traditional" test for the invocation of its police power. 6  This is
a realistic approach. If the regulations are not reasonably related to
the health and safety concerns presented by the medical procedures
involved, then the regulations would be invalid. This standard would
prevent attempts to intentionally restrict early abortions by overregu-
lating the entire class of medical procedures.
Regulations imposed solely on abortion procedures have uniformly
been held invalid as applied to the first trimester. 57  The basis of the
first trimester rule is the finding in Roe v. Wade that abortions per-
formed in early pregnancy are as safe or safer than natural child-
birth.5" Criticism has been leveled at that finding and the conclusion
drawn from it that there is no compelling state interest in a woman's
health during the first trimester of pregnancy. 9 The Supreme Court
found that the mortality rates for women undergoing legal first
trimester abortions were "as low or lower" than maternal mortality
rates for normal childbirth.60 The validity of the mortality statistics
used by the Court6' was questioned at the time in an amicus curiae
brief. 2 Moreover, all of the sources relied on in Roe for early abortion
55. 410 U.S. at 149-50 (emphasis added).
56. 505 F.2d at 1155.
57. See Word v. Poelker, 495 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1974); Hallmark Clinic v. North
Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D.N.C. 1974); Hodgson v.
Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Minn. 1974), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, sub
nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
58. 410 U.S. at 149.
59. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920, 942 n.117 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ely].
60. 410 U.S. at 149.
61. Id. at n.44.
62. See Brief for Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the American Col-
lege of Obstetrics and Gynecology as Amicus Curiae at 32-45, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief].
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mortality statistics were based on reports of abortions performed in
hospitals or extramural facilities which were subject to careful regula-
tion.63  Thus, one might suggest that first trimester abortions per-
formed in clinics which are not regulated for health and safety may
not be safer than childbirth.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the state's interest in pro-
tecting the life of pregnant women had disappeared in the first trimes-
ter because of the lower mortality rates. Even assuming that the statis-
tics used by the Court were valid, this conclusion does not seem to
follow as naturally as the Roe opinion expressed it. The fact that more
women die from childbirth than from early abortions is no justification
for prohibiting all health regulations in the first trimester, nor does
it warrant excluding abortions from regulations which are applicable
to medical procedures generally.64 A logical step from the recognition
of the relative safety of early abortion is suggested by constitutional
scholar John Harty Ely:
[E]ven a sure sense that abortion during the first trimester is safer
than childbirth would serve only to blunt a state's claim that it is,
for reasons relating to maternal health, entitled to proscribe abor-
tion; it would not support the inference the Court draws, that regu-
lations designed to make the abortion procedure safer during the
first trimester are impermissible. 65
The three-tiered scheme of Roe was intended to ensure that a wom-
an would be free to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, and
that she would be free to effectuate that decision. While some of the
risks involved in first trimester abortions may be reached by regula-
tions covering general medical practice, the state should not be pro-
hibited from trying to make first trimester abortions safer by direct
regulation. So long as such regulations are not used as a subterfuge to
prohibit or interfere unduly with early abortions, it seems that the
concern for not infringing upon the fundamental right to an abortion
For example, it was suggested that statistics from Eastern European countries were not
reliable. Id. at 44. Authority was cited showing that the mortality rate for abortion
in England and Wales was higher than the maternal mortality rate during the first year
after new abortion laws were implemented in those countries. Id. at 34.
63. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10-11, Friendship Medical Center, Ltd. v.
Chicago Board of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Mar.
25, 1975).
64. Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in
Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HA.v. L. REv. 1, 30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Tribe].
65. Ely, supra note 59, at 942 n. 117 (emphasis supplied). Although early abortions
are relatively safe, they are not without risk. Possible complications include hemor-
rhaging, perforation of the uterus and laceration of the cervix. Amicus Brief, supra note
62, at 47.
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would be satisfied.68 This argument is consistent with the Board of
Health's contention in Friendship that its regulations did not govern
the abortion decision but merely related to the manner in which it was
effectuated.67 But, as has been suggested, some of the Board's regula-
tions did restrict the decision itself. For example, the stated purpose of
the 24-hour rule 8 was to encourage sufficient reflection before a fi-
nal decision was made to have an abortion.69
In summary, it is clear that under the Roe guidelines any regula-
tions that single out abortion for special treatment are invalid as ap-
plied to the first trimester. 0 On the other hand, contrary to the view
of the majority in Friendship, health and safety regulations which ap-
ply to a range of medical procedures of similar risk and complexity,
within which abortion necessarily falls, should be valid as long as they
are reasonably related to the state's interest in the health of its citizens.
Such general standards should not include separate regulations appli-
cable only to first trimester abortion procedures.
Given the state of the law regarding direct regulations on first
trimester abortions, the voluntary adoption of standards presents a
possible alternative for promoting health and safety concerns. For ex-
ample, medical standards drafted by a voluntary association of abor-
tion clinics can promote proper health care by making compliance
with the standards a requirement of membership. 71 Also, health and
safety standards may be promoted by social service groups in the form
of guidelines for referral to abortion clinics.72
66. See Tribe, supra note 64, at 30.
67. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 32 supra.
69. The waiting period was initially to be three days and was intended to keep Chi-
cago from becoming an "abortion mill." It was also intended to encourage reflection by
the woman seeking the abortion. Interview with Edward F. King, Asst. Commissioner of
Health, Chicago Board of Health, in Chicago, Illinois, Jan. 31, 1975 [hereinafter cited
as King interview]. A waiting period can serve a valid purpose by encouraging a less
pressured decision, and it is a standard practice at some clinics. Interview with Martha
Shirrel, Counselor, Planned Parenthood Assn., in Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 6, 1975 [here-
inafter cited 4s Shirrel interview].
70. Tribe comments that the court implicitly recognized that some governmental reg-
ulation based on health interests is necessary throughout pregnancy when it said that
the state could require that all abortions be performed by licensed physicians. Tribe,
supra note 64, at 30.
71. A group of nine Chicago abortion clinics, including Friendship Medical Center,
have recently formed the Chicago Abortion Service Council (CASC). One of the pur-
poses of CASC is to set minimum medical and social standards adherence to which is
a condition of membership in the organization. CASC has asked various organizations
and agencies, including the Illinois Dept. of Public Health, the Chicago Board of Health
and Planned Parenthood Assn., to assist in drawing up standards. Interview with David
Tardy, Secretary of CASC, in Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 20, 1975.
72. In Chicago, groups such as Planned Parenthood Association and HERS (Health
Evaluation Referral Service) use guidelines to evaluate abortion clinics to which they
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REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ILLINOIS
While the Friendship case dealt only with local health standards,
regulations on abortion promulgated at the state level must also com-
ply with the guidelines set forth in Roe and Doe. State regulation of
abortion in Illinois is based on a regulatory scheme consisting of four
statutes and a set of agency regulations: (1) the Illinois Abortion
Law,73 (2) two amendments to the Medical Practice Act,74 (3) the
Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center Act,'7  and (4) the regula-
tions issued pursuant to that Act by the Illinois Department of Public
Health." The primary emphasis of this analysis of Illinois abortion
law is on the Ambulatory Surgical Treatment Center (ASTC) Act
and the Department of Public Health regulations. However, since all
of the statutes and regulations constitute a single regulatory scheme, it
is necessary to consider briefly some provisions in the other statutes
which may be invalid.
Illinois Abortion Law
In defining the conditions under which abortions may be per-
formed, 77 the Illinois Abortion Law appears on its face to comport
with the guidelines set out in Roe. The statute provides that in the first
trimester of pregnancy an abortion must be performed by a physi-
cian.78 This is the only restriction in the statute regarding the first
trimester. However, an amendment to the Medical Practice Act79 pro-
vides that the performance by a physician of an elective abortion in a
facility other than an abortion clinic or a hospital, constitutes grounds
for disciplinary action including revocation or suspension of his li-
cense to practice. In essence this is an effort to force physicians to per-
form first trimester abortions in an ASTC or a hospital rather than in
a private office. According to Roe, the state cannot impose require-
refer women. Evaluation is based both on medical and social criteria. Shirrel inter-
view, supra note 69.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 81-11 to 81-19 (1973).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 16a, § 201 (1973). Section 201 provides that medi-
cal personnel refusing to perform abortions may not be held liable in tort. This section
will not be discussed in this article.
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, §§ 157-8.1 to 16 (1973).
76. There have been two sets of regulations issued by the Department: Rules, Reg-
ulations and Standards Prescribed on Aug. 6, 1973, Pursuant to Ambulatory Surgical
Treatment Center Act [hereinafter cited as ASTC Regulations]; Revised Rules, Regu-
lations and Standards Prescribed on July 17, 1974, Pursuant to Ambulatory Surgical
Treatment Center Act [hereinafter cited as Revised ASTC Regulations].
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-14 (1973).
78. Id. § 81-14(a).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91, § 16a (1973).
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ments as to the facility in which first trimester abortions are per-
formed. The choice of facility is a matter which must be left to the
judgment of the physician. Since this section of the Medical Practice
Act constitutes an indirect restriction on first trimester abortions, un-
der the present state of the law it would not withstand constitutional
challenge. s0
The abortion law further provides that second trimester abortions
must be performed on an inpatient basis in a hospital."1 It has been
commented that such a requirement is not valid since it is not neces-
sary for the protection of the health of abortion patients. 82  However,
because second trimester abortions involve greater health risks, the pro-
vision is justifiable. It was recognized in Roe that the environment in
which an abortion is performed is an important consideration. The
Court noted that the American Public Health Association recommended
that second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital. s3 The
Court also expressly recognized the right of the state to limit the per-
formance of second trimester abortions to hospitals. 4
The abortion statute further requires that in the second trimester
measures for life support must be available and utilized whenever an
aborted fetus shows any signs of viability. s5 Requiring standby life
support measures in the second trimester is an appropriate require-
ment even though it is not a regulation related to the abortion pa-
tient's health. The state's interest in protecting "potential life" be-
comes compelling at viability. The Supreme Court recognized that the
point of viability can vary, although it generally occurs between the
24th and 28th weeks.86 Moreover, it is clear that technical advances
in medicine will accelerate the point of time during pregnancy at which
a determination of viability can be accurately made. 7 If life support
80. But see notes 64 through 67 supra and accompanying text.
81. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-14(b) (1973).
82. See Note, Implications of the Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe Legisla-
tion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 241 (1974). Contra, Note, The Illinois Abortion Statutes,
1974 U. ILL: LF. 421, 427-28 [hereinafter cited as Illinois Abortion Statutes].
83. 410 U.S. at 145.
84. Id. at 163. There is some language in Doe v. Bolton which may be contra-
dictory. It suggests that the state did not make a sufficient showing to prove that only
a hospital would be appropriate for second trimester abortions. 410 U.S. 179, 195
(1973). Also, it has been suggested that the Court misunderstood evidence on the
safety of abortion in the second trimester and drew the conclusion that the state had
not proven that its interest in maternal health justified the hospital requirement. See
Illinois Abortion Statutes, supra note 82, at 421.
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-14(b) (1973).
86. 410 U.S. at 160. But viability has been known to occur as early as the 20th
week. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1388 (unabridged lawyers' ed. 1972).
87. See Amicus Brief, supra note 62, at 25-26; NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1975, at 24-25.
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measures and equipment were not required at the earliest possible
period when viability may occur, the state would be greatly hampered
in its efforts to protect fetal life. 8
Finally, the Illinois Abortion Law provides that no abortions may
be performed in the third trimester unless necessary "to preserve the
life or to preserve the physical or mental health" of the pregnant
woman.8 9 This section is consistent with the Roe guidelines.9" How-
ever, according to Ely, this exception is at least as controversial as the
rest of the Roe decision.9 The objection is that preservation of the life
or health of a pregnant woman can be no justification for aborting a
fetus that is capable of survival outside the womb. Allowing any third
trimester abortion would seem to conflict with the state's compelling
interest in protecting fetal life. Indeed, in the late stages of pregnancy
the procedures for premature delivery and for abortion are substan-
tially the same regardless of the intention as to the survival of the fe-
tus. 2 Another commentator has submitted that the Court did not in-
tend to allow physicians to determine whether a procedure is a late-
stage abortion or premature delivery merely on the basis of the term
employed. 93
ASTC Act and Regulations
Before considering the provisions of the Ambulatory Surgical
Treatment Center Act and the ASTC regulations, some preliminary
observations will be helpful. First, the ASTC Act and Regulations
were drawn to meet a need that existed prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions in Roe and Doe. For medical and financial reasons there has
been a trend toward performing minor surgery in medical clinics on
88. If such a provision had been in effect and adhered to in Massachusetts, the
much-publicized manslaughter conviction of a Boston obstetrician, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16,
1975, at 1, col. 3, might have been avoided. That case involved a legal abortion late
in the second trimester (20-24 weeks). The conviction was based on a finding that the
physician was reckless in that he did not attempt to keep alive a fetus that had become
a "person alive outside the womb of the mother." Id. at 59, col. 3 (jury instructions).
The effect of this case in Illinois will probably be to reinforce the necessity for adher-
ence to the life support provision. See Chicago Tribune, Feb. 18, 1975, § 2 at 1, col.
7 (comments of Dr. Frederick Lake, President of the Illinois State Medical Society).
In addition, it will probably decrease the relatively small number of second trimester
abortions.
89. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-14(c) (1973). For a comment on the requirement
in this section that a physician performing a third trimester abortion must consult with
two other physicians, see The Illinois Abortion Statutes, supra note 82, at 429.
90. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
91. Ely, supra note 59, at 92 n.19.
92. Tribe, supra note 64, at 27.
93. Id. at 4 n.24.
731
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
an outpatient basis. 94 As a result, pressure has grown for the licensing
and regulation of such medical clinics.95 Regulations on ambulatory
medical centers were in the planning stages when Roe and Doe were
decided, and abortion clinics were then included in the scheme.96
Second, there are indications that the Department of Public Health
has made a good faith effort to comply with the Supreme Court abor-
tion decisions. This is not to say that good faith will save clearly inval-
id regulations. However, it is a factor which might tip the scales in fa-
vor of validity when considering borderline ASTC regulations.
Third, the different approaches utilized in determining the validity
of state regulations on abortion should be kept in mind when examin-
ing the constitutional validity of the state standards for ASTCs. Ac-
cording to the rationale adopted by the majority in Friendship, stan-
dards which are applicable to all ambulatory surgical centers must
meet the compelling interest test when applied to first trimester abor-
tion procedures.97 Since abortion clinics in Illinois can only perform
first trimester abortions, 98 and since the state has no compelling inter-
est in the first trimester, under this view the ASTC Act and Regula-
tions would be invalid as applied to abortion procedures. On the other
hand, according to Judge Fairchild's opinion, regulations concerning
a general class of medical procedures, which includes abortion, need
only be rationally related to the state's interest in health and safety to
be upheld.99
A state attempting to regulate abortion procedures as part of a gen-
eral scheme makes a fatal mistake when it singles out abortion for
treatment different from that given to other procedures. With this in
mind, consider the definition of an ASTC. 0  It includes any place
devoted primarily to performing surgical procedures or any place
where an abortion is performed regardless of the primary purpose of
the place. This seems to evidence an intent to single out abortion for
more extensive coverage than is given to other surgical procedures.
94. Services performed on an outpatient basis in a clinic can be performed less ex-
pensively. Also, treatment in such a manner involves less risk of infection. Telephone
interview with Dr. Gwendolyn B. Schmidt, Chairman ASTC Licensing Board, Feb. 14,
1974
95. For example pressure for regulation came from Blue Cross and public assistance
agencies. Telephone interview with Robert S. Gleason, Legal Advisor, Illinois Depart-
ment of Public Health, Feb. 13, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Gleason interview].
96. Id.
97. See notes 52 through 53 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 54 through 56 supra and accompanying text.
100. ILL. REy. STAT. ch. 111/, § 157-8.3(A) (1973).
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The broad definition applied to abortion is apparently intended to dis-
courage the performance of abortions in a physician's office by sub-
jecting the office to the same regulations as a medical clinic.' Ac-
cording to Roe, the situs of a first trimester abortion must be left to
the physician's judgment. Deletion of any specific reference to abor-
tion in the definition of an ASTC would remedy the defect since abor-
tion would be treated the same as other procedures.
The Act requires that all ASTCs be licensed by the Department of
Public Health.'02 The licensing procedure is approximately the same
as that employed in the licensing of hospitals.'0 3 The requirements for
obtaining a license are: (1) compliance with the ASTC Regulations,
(2) supervision of the facility by a physician, (3) performance of
surgical procedures by a physician who "is privileged to have his pa-
tients admitted by himself or an associated physician and is himself
privileged to perform surgical procedures in at least one Illinois hospi-
tal" and (4) maintenance of adequate medical records for each pa-
tient.' In addition, the ASTC Regulations as to licensing require
certain information to be supplied to the Department, including a de-
tailed description of the facility and a schematic plan showing the lo-
cation and square footage of different areas and their proposed use.'0 5
The license application must also include information concerning per-
sonnel, surgical facilities and compliance with building codes.' 0 6 The
regulations further provide that an ASTC will be licensed to perform
only those procedures which it includes in its application." 7
The ASTC licensing requirements are one example of state re-
quirements which might be invalid if applicable only to abortion fa-
cilities.'0 8  However, since the requirements are applicable to all
medical clinics performing minor surgery, it is appropriate to judge
them by the traditional rational relationship test. Clearly under this
standard, the state may license medical facilities in the interest of pub-
lic health.
101. A physician's office in which minor surgical procedures are performed has been
added to the list of exceptions to the definition of ASTC. Revised ASTC Regulations,
§ 2.3(6) (1974). It is doubtful whether abortion is considered a minor surgical proce-
dure in this context in light of the examples used to illustrate the exception (e.g. cystos-
copy).
102. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 157-8.4 (1973).
103. Hospital Licensing Act and Requirements, § 1-2.7 (1972).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 157-8.6 (1973).
105. Revised ASTC Regulations, § 3.1 (1974).
106. Id. § 3.2.
107. Id. §§ 3.1, 3.3.
108. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (D. Minn. 1974), dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction, sub nom., Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
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A plausible justification exists for the requirement that a physician
have admitting privileges in a hospital in the state. It may be easier for
such a physician to admit a patient to a hospital in an emergency since
it is likely that the hospital at which he has privileges will be in the
same area as the ASTC. The same type of regulation was at issue in
the Hallmark Clinic'09 case where one of the requirements for certifi-
cation of an abortion clinic was either the existence of a transfer
agreement, 110 or staff admitting privileges at a hospital within fifteen
minutes of the clinic."' These requirements were held invalid since
they did not exclude first trimester abortions and did not apply to
medical procedures generally. The ASTC regulatory scheme does not
have the same fault since it applies to all surgical procedures per-
formed in clinics.
The requirement that all surgery in an ASTC be performed by a
physician who is able to perform surgery in a hospital in the state
poses a potential conflict with the Roe guidelines. This provision of the
Act implies that a surgeon should perform the operations in ASTCs.
If imposed directly on abortion clinics such a regulation would be in-
valid. However, the Department of Public Health has avoided conflict
with Roe by requiring in the ASTC Regulations that surgical proce-
dures be performed by a licensed physician rather than a surgeon.1
2
The purpose of the ASTC Regulations is to establish standards and
regulations: (1) for the care of individuals in ASTCs and (2) for the
construction, maintenance and operation of ASTCs. 13 Several provi-
sions of the Regulations are substantially the same as the Chicago
Board of Health regulations. This can probably be explained by the
fact that the same sources were used as models."' For example, both
the Board of Health"' and the Department of Public Health relied on
109. 380 F. Supp. 1153 (E.D. N.C. (1974).
110. Id. at 1156. The Chicago Board of Health had a similar requirement. See
Abortion Regulations § VII, 367 F. Supp. 594, 608.
111. 380F. Supp. at 1156.
112. Revised ASTC Regulations,.§ 11.1 (1974). It should be noted that the interim
regulations required that surgery be performed by a licensed surgeon. ASTC Regula-
tions, § 11.1 (1973).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 157-8.2 (1973).
114. The Board of Health regulations were promulgated before the state's regula-
tions. However, the Department of Health Regulations had been in the works for two
years, during which time the Department cooperated and exchanged information with
other groups. Telephone interview with Paul X. Elbow, Chief, Division of Health Fa-
cilities, Department of Public Health, May 10, 1975.
115. The Board of Health used provisions from the Hospital Licensing Act and Re-
quirements as well as other sources, such as the abortion regulations of the New York
City Health Services Administration, to draw its regulations. King interview, supra note
69,
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the state Hospital Licensing Act and Requirements11" in drafting
some of their regulations.
The first section of the Regulations states that, in many respects, the
functions of an ASTC are similar to those of a hospital.117 The appar-
ent goal of the Regulations is to ensure that ambulatory facilities will
provide the same high quality of care as hospitals. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that many of the regulations are patterned after the Hospital
Licensing Act and Requirements. For example, the entire section of
the ASTC Regulations dealing with standards for building, design
and construction11 is adopted from the hospital regulations.",, Simi-
larly, the requirement that any ASTC operating in a multi-storied
building must have an elevator of certain size is incorporated from the
Hospital Licensing Act Requirements. 12 The requirement that all tis-
sues removed during surgery be examined by a pathologist is adopted
from the hospital regulations as well. 121
The Department of Public Health issued the ASTC Regulations
shortly after the ASTC Act became law. Changes made by the De-
partment in those regulations demonstrate that the state is attempting
to avoid conflict with the Roe guidelines. For example, the first set of
Regulations required that a "board certified" obstetrician, surgeon or
anesthesiologist serve as supervisor of a clinic.122 The revised ASTC
Regulations now merely require that the supervisor be a "qualified
physician." 123
One section of the ASTC Regulations deals exclusively with
ASTCs which perform abortions.124 Among the provisions in this sec-
tion are requirements: (1) that diagnosis of a pregnancy is the re-
116. Promulgated by the Illinois Department of Public Health pursuant to the Hos-
pital Licensing Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 /, §§ 142-57 (1953).
117. Revised ASTC Regulations § 1.1 (1974).
118. Id. § 13.
119. Hospital Licensing Act and Requirements § 20 (1972).
120. Id. § 20-10.4 (1972). A similar requirement was invalidated in Friendship.
See Abortion Regulations § VIII, 367 F. Supp. .594, 611. An identical provision was
also invalidated in Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1024 (D. Minn. 1974),
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
121. Compare Revised ASTC Regulations § 11.6 (1974) with Hospital Licensing
Act and Requirements § 20-10.4 (1972). The same provision appears in the Board of
Health's regulations. See Abortion Regulations § XVIII(e), 367 F. Supp. 594, 615.
122. ASTC Regulations §§ 2.4 to 2.6, 4.3. This requirement applied to abortion
clinics as well. Id. §§ 2.4 to 2.6, 12.1.
123. Revised ASTC Regulations §§ 2.4, 4.3 (1974).
124. Id. § 12. Dr. Joyce C. Lashof says that this section is included because it is
standard practice to tailor regulations to specific problems. Telephone interview with
Dr. Joyce C. Lashof, Director, Illinois Department of Public Health, Feb. 11, 1975.
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sponsibility of the physician performing the abortion; 2 ' (2) that cer-
tain laboratory tests be performed; 26 (3) that sufficient time be
allowed between initial examination and the abortion procedure to
permit thorough consideration and a "firm decision" by the pa-
tient;'27 (4) that there exists a written informed consent statement
and signed authorization from the patient; 128 and (5) that family
planning services be available. 129
This separate section regulating abortion is unconstitutional under
present case law since it fails to exclude the first trimester and subjects
abortion to regulations which do not apply to other medical proce-
dures of the same risk and complexity. l 0 The regulations would be
valid only under the view that the state should be allowed to make
first trimester abortions safer by direct regulations that do not inter-
fere with the right to an abortion.' An example of a direct regula-
tion permissible under this view is one requiring a thorough medical
history and complete physical examination prior to abortion. 132 This
regulation would not infringe upon the woman's right to an abortion,
nor would it interfere with the physician's right to make the abortion
decision with his patient. It merely attempts to ensure that abortions
will be performed safely. The Roe approach to such a regulation re-
quires that the extent of the medical examination must be left to the
medical judgement of the physician with judicial and professional
remedies available for any failure to exercise proper judgment.13
However, the availability of subsequent remedies does not eliminate
the need for minimal public health standards.
Whatever the theoretical validity of some of the Regulations, real-
istically it is possible that they will not be challenged. Since the ASTC
Regulations contain no provision which is as objectionable as the 24-
hour rule that precipitated the Friendship suit, 3 ' it is likely that the
Regulations will be complied with. Moreover, state officials are aware
of the tenuous validity of some provisions of the ASTC Act and Regu-
125. Revised ASTC Regulations § 12.32 (1974).
125. Id. § 12.33.
127. Id. § 12.35. This section is similar to the 24-hour waiting requirement in the
Chicago regulations. See supra notes 6 and 32.
128. Revised ASTC Regulations, § 12.51 (1974).
129. Id. § 12.55. This would include the type of counseling recommended by the
American Public Health Assn. and approved in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 145 (1973).
130. See note 57 supra and cases cited therein.
131. For further discussion, see notes 57 through 69 supra and accompanying text.
132. See Revised ASTC Regulations § 12.33.
133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973).
134. Cf. Buying Protection at the Abortion Mill, CICAGO, Jan. 1975, at 14 (com-
ments of Dr. Howard).
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lations. 135  Therefore, some restraint in enforcement may be expected
from the Department.
In the event that the Act and Regulations are challenged, all men-
tion of abortion must be striken in order to remedy the defects which
presently exist. However, under the view taken in this article, the basic
scheme of regulations should be upheld as a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power. The state should not be compelled to exempt
abortion procedures from health standards designed to cover medical
procedures which are similar to abortion in risk and complexity.
CONCLUSION
The Roe and Doe decisions spawned confusion and uncertainty re-
garding acceptable governmental regulation of abortion. The efforts
of state and local health authorities to regulate abortion procedures
have not always fallen within the guidelines set by the Supreme Court.
In the Friendship case, the Seventh Circuit applied the principles of
Roe to invalidate regulations which were promulgated by a local
health board and were applicable only to first trimester abortion. The
Friendship decision also offered two different views of the validity of
general health regulations applicable to a class of medical procedures
which includes abortions. The majority held that general regulations,
like regulations dealing solely with first trimester abortions, must
meet the compelling interest test when applied to abortion proce-
dures. The opposing view was that general regulations need only sat-
isfy the rational relationship test to be valid.
Although Roe and Doe require the result reached in Friendship,
protection of the right to an abortion does not require that direct regu-
lations on first trimester abortions must be automatically invalidated.
As long as such regulations do not interfere with the abortion decision
or unduly hamper its effectuation, health authorities should not be
prevented from employing direct regulations to make early abortions
safer. Further, Roe and Doe do not require that general regulations
must meet the compelling state interest test. Regulations which in-
clude abortions in a class with similar medical procedures should be
valid if rationally related to the state's interest in health.
JAMES W. FORD
135. Gleason interview, supra note 95.
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